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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a futile quest to bring some coherence to its political gerrymandering 
jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has insisted on either aping 
the approach of its racial vote dilution jurisprudence or using race to regulate 
politics. The fact that this quest has been remarkably unsuccessful has, thus 
far, scarcely proven incapable of deterring the Court from its pursuit. As a 
consequence of this ineffectual exercise, the Court finds itself in a bind: a 
majority of the Court is deeply troubled by partisan excesses in legislative 
line-drawing, but is without an approach for bridling such excesses.  
Judging from the early returns in the form of League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC),1 the Roberts Court appears similarly 
ensnared and seems unlikely to develop anytime soon a resolution that will 
untie this wickedly tangled knot. In LULAC, various plaintiffs alleged that 
Texas’ 2003 congressional redistricting constituted an unconstitutional racial 
and partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Justice Kennedy wrote an 
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, parts of which were joined by 
six other Justices. In a part of the opinion in which no other Justice agreed to 
join him, Justice Kennedy decided that the congressional redistricting plan at 
issue was not an unconstitutional political gerrymander because the plaintiffs 
did not present an administrable standard.2 Though it is clear from LULAC 
that political gerrymandering claims remain justiciable—an issue that was 
somewhat ambiguous in Vieth3—it is also clear that the Court is no closer to 
an agreement on an administrable standard.4 Thus, LULAC offers nothing 
new on the issue of administrability and was in that sense a disappointment.5 
 
∗ Russell M. & Elizabeth M. Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota 
Law School. Thanks to Luis Fuentes-Rohwer who is a great sparring partner on these and 
many issues. Thanks also to Jim Gardner, Heather Gerken, Sam Issaacharoff, Ellen Katz, 
Dan Ortiz, Rick Pildes, and Dan Tokaji, whose comments challenged and further spurred 
my thinking. 
1 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC]. 
2 Id. at 2609–11. 
3 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
4 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed with Justice Kennedy’s conclusion 
that the plaintiffs did not present an administrable standard. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 
(Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They 
purported to offer no opinion on the issue of the justiciability of political gerrymanders. 
Id. Justices Scalia and Thomas continue to adhere to their positions that political 
gerrymandering claims are not justiciable. Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., 
1186 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1185 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
That the Court failed to deliver on the implied promise of developing an 
administrable standard for adjudicating political gerrymander claims does not 
mean that it has given up on the near-term possibility of limiting the 
propensity of legislative actors to engage in extreme partisan line-drawing. 
Indeed, as I shall argue in this Article, the Court’s decision in LULAC may be 
precisely such an attempt.  
One way to read LULAC is to regard Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that 
the State violated Section 2 in redrawing the boundaries of District 23 as a 
triumph for the concept of racial representation. In Part III of the opinion, 
which was joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the State violated Section 2 of the VRA by 
redrawing a majority-Latino district, District 23, and reducing the number of 
Latino voters in that district. The Court also concluded that the State could 
not cure the Section 2 violation by offsetting the loss of District 23 with the 
creation of a different majority-Latino district, District 25, because District 
25 was not required by Section 2—a necessary requirement, from the 
majority’s perspective, for justifying an offset. There is a certain amount of 
nuance or sophistication in Justice Kennedy’s vote dilution discussion. 
Unlike the Shaw line of cases or the nose-holding, tiptoeing-through-the-
muck image conjured by the Chief Justice’s “sordid business . . . divvying us 
up by race”6 obiter in LULAC, Justice Kennedy’s opinion reflected a certain 
level of comfort with the concept of racial representation. Justice Kennedy 
seemed at ease commenting on the extent of racially-polarized voting in the 
area around District 23. Though Justice Kennedy expressed some concern 
with race essentialism, his observation that the State should not treat all 
Latino voters alike simply because they are Latino is not deployed to 
undermine the concept of racial representation—as in the Shaw cases—but to 
buttress the Court’s argument that the State should not have diluted Latino 
voting power in District 23.7 Note for example the non-awkward references 
to “Latino voting power,” “Latino political power,” and “Latino voters.” 
 
dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg would dismiss the gerrymandering question as 
improvidently considered on the ground that the Court remains deeply fractured on the 
issue. Id. at 2647. Justices Stevens and Breyer would find a constitutional violation. Id. at 
2635. 
5 Compare id. at 2607 (“We do not revisit the justiciability holding but do proceed to 
examine whether appellants’ claims offer the Court a manageable, reliable measure of 
fairness for determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”), with 
id. at 2612 (“We conclude that appellants have established no legally impermissible use 
of political classifications. For this reason, they state no claim on which relief may be 
granted for their statewide challenge.”). 
6 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2663 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
7 See infra Part III. 
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These are all references that rest uncomfortably with a strictly-construed 
prohibition on racial essentialism.8 Moreover, in declining to find that 
African-American voters suffered vote dilution as a consequence of the 
dismantling of District 24, Justice Kennedy arguably faulted black voters for 
not having demonstrably distinctive political interests from white voters in 
the district and for not providing a primary challenge to the white incumbent, 
Martin Frost. Lastly, in LULAC plaintiffs of color (at least some of them) 
finally prevailed in a vote dilution lawsuit at the Supreme Court, and all this 
by the pen of Justice Kennedy. This was a far cry from the halcyon days of 
Shaw v. Reno, Miller v. Johnson, and their progeny.  
Yet, upon closer inspection of the facts of the case and the Court’s 
reasoning, it would be inaccurate to say that LULAC is only or even 
primarily a racial gerrymandering case. By most accounts, the overriding 
purpose of the 2003 congressional redistricting plan was to maximize the 
number of Republican congressional seats and to minimize the number of 
Democratic congressional seats.9 The plan targeted all ten white incumbent 
Democrat congressmen for defeat and none of the Democratic 
representatives of color.10 The Republican strategy was to draw a neat line 
between race and politics and to pursue as radical a partisan agenda as 
possible.11 
This is not to say that voters of color were not adversely impacted by the 
redistricting plan. Given the relationship between voters of color and the 
Democratic Party, especially in Texas where most citizens of color vote for 
the Democratic Party, a redistricting plan that adversely affects the 
Democratic Party is sure to have a negative impact on voters of color as 
Democrats.12 As between a racial vote dilution claim and a partisan 
gerrymandering claim, the partisan gerrymandering claim is best supported 
by the facts of the case.  
Moreover, it is hard to reconcile the fact that Justice Kennedy stretches 
existing doctrine to find racial vote dilution in District 23, yet goes out of his 
way not to find racial vote dilution in District 24. As the Chief Justice rightly 
stated, “[w]hatever the majority believes it is fighting with its holding, it is 
 
8 While we are at it, notice also the use of the appellation “Latino” as opposed to 
“Hispanic.”  
9 See, e.g., STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 
IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY 214 (2007) (noting that the purpose of the 
2003 redistricting was to “maximize Republican voting strength while minimizing 
Democratic voting strength”). 
10 Id. at 98. 
11 Id. at 108 (“The final [redistricting] plan was as partisan as the Republicans 
thought the law would allow.”). 
12 Id. at 214. 
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not vote dilution on the basis of race . . . .”13 To find sufficient facts from 
LULAC to support a racial vote dilution claim but not a partisan 
gerrymandering claim is puzzling.  
So what then are Justice Kennedy and the majority fighting with their 
holding if not racial discrimination? In this Article I shall explain two ways 
of reading LULAC: first as a case that vindicates the value of racial 
representation, second as a case concerned about representation itself. Part II 
describes why LULAC failed as a straightforward partisan gerrymandering 
case. Part III explores LULAC as a race case. Part III also argues that if 
LULAC is to be understood as a race case, it will be because Justice Kennedy 
was defending a nuanced concept of anti-essentialism that focuses on the 
authenticity of racial representation. Part IV argues that politics, not race, is 
the majority’s concern in LULAC and that the case is the first application of 
Justice Kennedy’s nascent “representation rights” concept first introduced in 
Vieth. Part V considers the meaning of LULAC and examines whether 
LULAC signals doom for the VRA, as at least one prominent commentator 
has argued. I reject that argument and propose that LULAC is the Court’s 
attempt to constrain excessive partisan gerrymandering by using race. I then 
explore the benefits and limits of that strategy. Part V also argues that 
LULAC has introduced a radically new equal protection right that could 
potentially destabilize election law and the Court’s larger antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence. I conclude with a cursory evaluation of the impact of LULAC 
on voting rights doctrine. 
II. A POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING CASE THAT WASN’T 
The underlying facts of LULAC must have seemed so promising to the 
Court when it first agreed to hear the case. In the shadow of the severely 
fractured Vieth opinion, the Court expected to resolve a highly visible, mid-
decade, extremely partisan, Tom Delay redistricting plan. With the 
Democratic state legislators fleeing the state to prevent a legislative quorum, 
there was high drama in Texas and the arcana of redistricting was finally 
starring on the public stage. The Court was poised to say something 
important on one of the least likely issues to capture the public’s imagination. 
Unfortunately, the facts did not quite cooperate. The case was not as 
straightforward as it first appeared. As a point of departure, the Republican 
gerrymander was an unabashed attempt to undo the effects of previous pro-
Democratic gerrymanders. As Justice Stevens noted, Texas had long been a 
one-party state. Since the Civil war, the “Democrats maintained their 
political power by excluding black voters from participating in primary 
 
13 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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elections, by the artful management of multimember electoral schemes, and, 
most recently, by outrageously partisan gerrymandering.”14 Though the 2003 
Republican redistricting plan was clearly a pro-Republican gerrymander, it 
was as clearly the Republicans’ attempt to undo past Democratic 
gerrymanders. Indeed, from Justice Kennedy’s perspective, the swing Justice 
on these issues, the Republican plan was an obvious improvement over the 
previous Democratic gerrymanders. Writing only for himself, he described 
the plan as “fairer” than the previous plans because the plan “can be seen as 
making the party balance more congruent to statewide party power.”15 Thus, 
what at first blush appeared to be an easy case of overreaching by the 
Republican Party, upon closer examination became less certain; neither party 
could claim that it had acted with clean hands in the process. 
Second, even the mid-decade re-redistricting aspect of the case, which 
gave it a particularly sordid partisan flavor and was thought to provide the 
Supreme Court a narrow basis for reversing the three-judge panel below,16 
seemed less objectionable upon closer look. The Republicans argued that this 
was not a re-redistricting as the first redistricting was a court-drawn plan. 
Justice Kennedy largely agreed. The Constitution, Justice Kennedy noted, 
delegates redistricting to the elected branches: Congress and the state 
legislatures.17 Because redistricting is quintessentially a legislative function 
and is most legitimate when performed by a legislature,18 “if a legislature 
acts to replace a court-drawn plan with one of its own design, no 
presumption of impropriety should attach to the legislative decision . . . .”19 
Moreover, as Justice Kennedy intimated, it is not clear that there is 
anything particularly tawdry with mid-decade re-redistricting per se—even 
assuming that the previous redistricting was performed by the legislature. A 
re-redistricting can improve upon a previous redistricting by more accurately 
reflecting the preferences of the relevant electorate, especially where there 
are significant mid-decade population shifts. Unless one is willing to adopt a 
per se rule against mid-decade redistricting and forgo the potential of its 
salutary effects, one has to examine “the content of the legislation 
 
14 Id. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
15 Id. at 2610 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 
16 See id. at 2632 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contrasting “the narrow question 
presented” by LULAC with the question presented in Vieth). 
17 Id. at 2607–08. 
18 See id. at 2608–09 (noting that “to prefer a court-drawn plan to a legislature’s 
replacement would be contrary to the ordinary and proper operation of the political 
process”). 
19 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2608. 
20 Id. at 2610. 
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Fundamentally, the Court in LULAC was left in the same place as it 
found itself in Vieth—troubled by political gerrymandering but without a 
standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders. Having 
concluded that the Republican gerrymander was fairer than the previous 
court-drawn plan and the previous Democratic gerrymanders, and having 
concluded that the mid-decade character of the case was a red herring, the 
matter appeared to be at an end. 
III. LULAC AS VINDICATING RACIAL REPRESENTATION 
The Court then turned its attention to deciding whether the State violated 
the rights of voters of color in enacting the redistricting plan. Justice 
Kennedy, this time joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, 
concluded that Texas violated Section 2 of the VRA when the State removed 
approximately 100,000 mainly Latino—and almost by description 
Democratic—voters from District 23 in order to protect Republican 
incumbent Representative Henry Bonilla.  
With one stroke of the pen, Justice Kennedy (with the helpful 
acquiescence of four other Justices) transformed a dispute over partisan 
gerrymandering into an improbable and conflicted one about race. Given that 
LULAC came two terms after Vieth, it was not surprising that the Court did 
not have much new to say on the standards for resolving partisan 
gerrymandering claims. Though we learned from LULAC that a majority of 
the Court believes that partisan gerrymandering claims remain justiciable, we 
did not even learn whether the Chief Justice and Justice Alito are part of that 
majority. What is surprising about LULAC is the critical role that race played 
in the case. And, as I shall argue later, what is interesting and unique about 
LULAC is the manner in which race was deployed to limit politics. 
This Part explores a characterization of LULAC as a guarded vindication 
for the concept of racial representation. The argument here is that to the 
extent LULAC is a race case, the concern is with the authenticity of racial 
representation. To appreciate this point one must first come to grips with the 
manner in which Justice Kennedy attempted to overcome two substantial 
hurdles in order to conclude that the State violated the VRA in altering the 
population of District 23.  
The first hurdle is the trial court’s unequivocal factual determinations. 
The trial court found as a matter of fact that the State was motivated by two 
related reasons for modifying District 23. The trial court stated, “The record 
presents undisputed evidence that the Legislature desired to increase the 
number of Republican votes cast in Congressional District 23 to shore up 
Bonilla’s base and assist in his reelection.”21 The trial court subsequently 
 
21 Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 488 (E.D. Tex. 2004).  
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noted, “It is undisputed that Plan 1374C eliminated Congressional District 23 
as a district with a Latino majority citizen voting age population for the 
political purpose of increasing Republican voters in the district and shoring 
up the reelection chances of the Republican incumbent.”22 The trial court 
also concluded that “[t]here is little question but that the single-minded 
purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan 
advantage.”23 Thus, from the trial court’s unambiguous and insistently 
emphatic determinations, the only reasons for the alteration of District 23 
were for the sometimes complementary purposes of partisan and incumbency 
protection. The trial court’s opinion virtually screams: this case is about 
politics, it has nothing to do with race.24  
The second hurdle is the creation of District 25. As a factual matter, 
District 25 is relevant because its existence buttressed further the trial court’s 
finding that the State did not intend to violate the Section 2 rights of Latino 
voters and did not do so in effect. It is hard to argue that there was intent to 
discriminate or discriminatory effect when the Legislature, in order to offset 
the loss of District 23, created a substitute majority-Latino district, which, as 
the Chief Justice argued, was more effective than District 23 as a Latino 
opportunity district. Notwithstanding the strength of this point, the hurdle 
here is not factual but doctrinal.  
As a doctrinal matter, states have been given wide latitude in determining 
where to draw Section 2 districts. This latitude is thought to be necessary 
because there are often many goals that the state is trying to maximize in the 
redistricting process. These goals include satisfying the one person one vote 
principle, respecting relevant geographical boundaries, satisfying the VRA, 
and maximizing political opportunities. Consequently, as the Court 
maintained in Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), even where a plaintiff has conclusively 
demonstrated that her vote has been diluted under Section 2, “[t]his does not 
mean that a § 2 plaintiff has the right to be placed in a majority-minority 
district once a violation of the statute is shown. States retain broad discretion 
in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of § 2.”25 
When one combines the trial court’s findings of fact and Shaw II’s 
doctrinal point, LULAC was an unlikely race case. In order to reject the trial 
court’s findings of fact, the Court had to conclude that the trial court’s 
findings of fact were clearly erroneous. That is, Justice Kennedy had to 
determine not only that there were facts in the record that proved racial intent 
or effect, but that the facts were so overwhelming that the trial court’s 
findings went against the great weight of the evidence. Given the record, this 
 
22 Id. at 496. 
23 Id. at 470. 
24 See id. at 472 (noting again that “politics, not race, drove Plan 1374C”). 
25 Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 917 n.9 (1996). 
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was a formidable hurdle. Despite this hurdle, Justice Kennedy did not simply 
conclude that the trial court was wrong on the Section 2 point, but he went as 
far as to note that the State’s action might even support a finding of 
intentional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.26 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that a state has wide discretion of where 
to draw a Section 2 district. However, he maintained, the state’s discretion 
“has limits.”27 He went on to note that a proposed Section 2 offset district is 
only consistent with Section 2 where the “racial group[s] in each area had a 
§ 2 right and both could not be accommodated.”28 A racial group does not 
have a Section 2 right if the group’s population is non-compact or 
dispersed.29 Justice Kennedy concluded, “since there is no § 2 right to a 
district that is not reasonably compact, the creation of a noncompact district 
does not compensate for the dismantling of a compact opportunity district.”30 
Therefore, Justice Kennedy reasoned, the creation of District 25 did not 
suffice as a substitute district because District 25 was not sufficiently 
compact.31 
To the extent that LULAC says something about racial representation,32 
the case is a surprising absolution for the concept of racial representation. 
Admittedly, it is tempting to read LULAC as an anti-racial essentialism case. 
It is true that Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to pay homage to the principle 
of anti-racial essentialism. Specifically, in his discussion of District 25, 
Justice Kennedy explains that the fundamental problem with District 25 is its 
combination of “two far-flung segments of a racial group with disparate 
interests.”33 Quoting the Court’s earlier decisions in Shaw I and Miller v. 
Johnson, Justice Kennedy further noted that when “the only common index 
is race,”34 the State is operating upon the impermissible assumption that 
racial identity dictates political identity.35 “[B]y failing to account for the 
differences between people of the same race,” Justice Kennedy warned, we 
 
26 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2622 (2006) (noting that the alteration of District 23 
“bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection 
violation”). 
27 Id. at 2616 (“The Court has rejected the premise that a State can always make up 
for less-than-equal opportunity of some individuals by providing greater opportunity to 
others.”). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 2617. 
30 Id. (citation omitted). 
31 Id. at 2616–17. 
32 I shall argue shortly that LULAC uses race instrumentally to curb politics. 
33 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2618. 
34 Id. at 2619. 
35 Id. at 2618 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)). 
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do “a disservice” to the twin goals of eliminating racial discrimination and 
creating a society where race is no longer relevant.36  
At a very superficial level, Justice Kennedy’s worry about race 
essentialism harkens back to the strong anti-essentialism strain identified 
with the quintessential anti-essentialism case, Shaw I, and its progeny. 
Indeed, as I note above, Justice Kennedy explicitly relied upon Shaw I and 
Miller. However, Justice Kennedy’s relatively weak gesture in the direction 
of anti-essentialism is deployed for a very different reason than the anti-
essentialism argument of the Court in the Shaw line of cases. 
In the Shaw line of cases, the anti-essentialism argument was deployed to 
remonstrate against race-consciousness in the line-drawing process. The 
central question that was presented in the Shaw cases was the extent to which 
the State could depart from the ideal of colorblindness in order to provide 
representation from voters of color. The Court was deciding between a 
modicum of race-blindness and race-consciousness. The clear import of the 
Court’s holding in Shaw and its progeny was that the State should always 
strive to be raceblind; racial districting, “even for remedial purposes” can be 
essentialist.37 Thus, the State is justified in using race in the redistricting 
process where it uses race sparingly and where it has a compelling 
justification for doing so.  
By contrast, in LULAC, Justice Kennedy is not deciding between race-
consciousness and race-blindness; rather, the choice is between token racial 
representation and authentic racial representation. For the purpose of this 
analysis, an authentic representative is one that is substantially the choice of 
the relevant electorate with minimal interference by the State. A token 
representative is one that is primarily assigned by the State with minimal 
input by the relevant electorate. Authentic representation attempts to 
maximize the autonomy and agency of voters.38 Justice Kennedy’s anti-
essentialism argument is not an argument against race-consciousness and 
racial representation. It is about the need to protect the autonomy of these 
Latino voters to choose their representative against interference by the State, 
which would prefer a different choice.  
Justice Kennedy’s primary task is to explain why the dismantling of a 
“Latino opportunity district” is inconsistent with Section 2 of the VRA. 
Unlike the Court’s task in the Shaw line of cases, Justice Kennedy’s purpose 
in LULAC relies upon the necessary assumption, which Justice Kennedy 
engages in repeatedly throughout the opinion, that one can coherently refer to 
Latinos in District 23 not just as a racial group but as a racial group that 
 
36 Id. at 2618. 
37 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
38 I describe this distinction in more detail infra Part III. 
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shares a distinctive political identity.39 Put differently, the framework of the 
Section 2 inquiry not only assumes but requires explicitly a political 
cohesiveness for which race is “the only common index.”40 The whole 
enterprise is otherwise incoherent. Unlike the Shaw line of cases, which 
seemed to question the constitutional viability of that assumption, Justice 
Kennedy explicitly deploys that assumption to address what he understands 
as the problem with the revised District 23. 
From Justice Kennedy’s opinion, there are at least two problems with the 
modification of District 23. First, by modifying the lines of District 23, the 
State impeded Latinos in District 23 from choosing a representative of their 
choice. As Justice Kennedy explains, at the very moment that Latinos were 
about to choose their own representative and dispose of the representative 
that was unresponsive to their interests, “[t]he State . . . made fruitless the 
Latinos’ mobilization efforts.”41  
This assumption—that there is a critical link between racial and political 
identity—is fundamentally inconsistent with the strong anti-essentialism bent 
of the Shaw cases. Recall that in Shaw, there was no reason to believe that 
the district in question, North Carolina’s congressional District 12, 
aggregated voters on the basis of race without regard to either political 
identity. In fact, the Court seemed reluctant to explore any possible linkages 
between racial and political identity. To explore such a linkage would itself 
give credence to an assumption that the Court viewed as essentialist and 
therefore constitutionally suspect. Not so with LULAC.  
Justice Kennedy’s second problem is the fact that the State used race 
cynically to create the impression of authentic representation. According to 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis, Latino voters were entitled to one additional 
representative in south and west Texas. Moreover, Latino voters in District 
23 were about to select a representative of their own choosing. Instead of 
respecting that choice, Texas assigned Latino voters a “Latino” 
representative. 
Consider three possible fictional candidates for the title of authentic 
Latino representative. Candidate number one is a Latino Republican 
candidate from District 23; we will call him Henry Bonilla. Candidate 
number two is the representative from District 25. He is an Anglo Democrat 
from central Texas; we will call him Lloyd Doggett. Candidate number three 
is the Latino representative that Latino voters from District 23 would have 
chosen in the absence of interference by the State—i.e., if the State had not 
 
39 See, e.g., LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619 (“The Latinos in District 23 had found an 
efficacious political identity.”); see also Ellen Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1163, 1174 (2007). 
40 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619. 
41 Id. at 2622. 
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moved 100,000 Latino voters out of District 23. We will call this would be 
representative Ciro Rodriguez. Among those three, which candidate has the 
weakest claim to authenticity, and which has the strongest claim to 
authenticity? 
Quite clearly Henry Bonilla is the least authentic Latino representative. 
Henry Bonilla has two facts that cut in his favor. First, he is Latino. 
Superficially, one can describe him as a Latino Republican elected in a 
district with a majority of Latino voters. But this fact is irrelevant as it is 
simply an unvarnished version of the old debate between descriptive and 
substantive representation. No serious thinker today believes in such a 
narrow conception of descriptive representation. Thus, the fact that Bonilla is 
Latino is of no moment. This is a fairly prosaic point. 
Moreover, the fact that he was elected in a district where the majority of 
the individuals of voting age were Latinos is less significant than it might 
otherwise be. The redistricting plan reduced the number of Latinos in District 
23 just enough to assure the election of a Latino Republican incumbent and 
maintain sufficient number of Latinos in the district so that the voting age 
population of the district—though not the citizenship population—was 
majority Latino. Justice Kennedy found this devious practice particularly 
irksome. As he stated, the manner in which the state redrew District 23 
“becomes even more suspect when considered in light of evidence 
suggesting that the State intentionally drew District 23 to have a nominal 
Latino voting-age majority (without a citizen voting-age majority) for 
political reasons.”42  
What matters is that Bonilla is demonstrably ideologically opposed to the 
ideological preferences of Latino voters in the region and that they have 
repeatedly repudiated him in very clear terms. So, we can confidently and 
easily conclude that Bonilla is not an authentic representative of the Latino 
community in District 23. With similar confidence, we can maintain that Ciro 
Rodriguez is an authentic Latino representative because he is the candidate 
that Latino voters would have chosen for themselves in the absence of strong 
interference by the State. Thus, as between these two representatives, the 
choice is clear.  
The complication of course is District 25. The issue that plagued Justice 
Kennedy in LULAC is whether one should consider District 25’s 
representative authentic or not. The complication here is two-fold because 
the question cannot be answered totally in the abstract. It is not sufficient to 
ask whether Lloyd Doggett, the wealthy white representative from central 
Texas, is an authentic representative; one must also ask whether he is an 
adequate substitute for the Mexican-born Ciro Rodriguez.  
 
42 Id. 126 S. Ct. at 2623. 
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When the State altered District 23 to protect Bonilla and created District 
25, it thereby made a choice in favor of Doggett at the expense of Rodriguez. 
More importantly, it did so with a marked cynical insouciance for the varied 
Latino communities which were impacted by its redistricting plan. It had no 
respect for the different Latino communities in the area.43 The State broke 
apart one community and tied together two other communities not because 
the State decided that this was the best way to represent the Latino 
communities in the area, but because the State wanted to promote its political 
agenda while paying lip service to the idea of Latino representation.44 It is 
this move by the State that troubled Justice Kennedy.  
To the extent that LULAC is a race case, Justice Kennedy’s opinion is a 
nuanced—and dare I say progressive—defense of the relationship between 
racial identity and political identity. The essentialism that Justice Kennedy 
finds troubling is this cynical use of race for strictly partisan purposes at the 
expense of authentic racial representation. It is the fundamental assumption 
of the swap of District 25 for District 23—that one Latino community and 
therefore one Latino representative is just as good as another—that prompts 
the concern with racial essentialism. Justice Kennedy’s complaint is not that 
the State has privileged a race-conscious process at the expense of a race-
blind one, but that the State has privileged, without sufficient justification, an 
inauthentic conception of racial representation at the expense of an authentic 
conception without sufficient justification. Viewed in these terms, Justice 
Kennedy is articulating a rather sophisticated defense of racial 
representation. The objection to this type of essentialism—that the State is 
indifferent to the racial authenticity of representation—is quite different from 
the objection that animated the Shaw cases—that the very idea of racial 
representation is itself essentialist. 
IV. LULAC AS VINDICATING REPRESENTATIONAL RIGHTS 
But this is not the only way to understand LULAC. The racial 
representation reading of LULAC is based upon the premise that race was at 
 
43 See id. at 2618. 
44 Justice Kennedy stated: 
The State chose to break apart a Latino opportunity district to protect the incumbent 
congressman from the growing dissatisfaction of the cohesive and politically active 
Latino community in the district. The State then purported to compensate for this 
harm by creating an entirely new district that combined two groups of Latinos, 
hundreds of miles apart, that represent different communities of interest. Under § 2, 
the State must be held accountable for the effect of these choices in denying equal 
opportunity to Latino voters. 
Id. at 2623.  
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the center of the Court’s concern. It implies that LULAC is primarily about 
race and the meaning of the VRA. But consider a different reading of LULAC 
where politics returns to the center of Justice Kennedy’s concern.  
In this Part, I shall argue for an alternative and perhaps more persuasive 
reading of LULAC where the concern is not with race itself but the fact that 
the State supplanted the very purpose of elections by assigning representation 
and did so precisely to undermine the accountability function of elections. 
This way of understanding LULAC gets us closer to Justice Kennedy’s 
concern about “representational rights” in the political gerrymandering 
context.  
The key to understanding LULAC and its meaning is to resolve why 
Justice Kennedy preferred District 23 to Districts 24 and 25. The critical 
datum in the construction of District 23 is the fact that the District was 
constructed to protect Henry Bonilla. This was an incumbent protection 
gerrymander with side benefits for the Republican Party. The State of Texas 
removed from Bonilla’s district the voters who were most dissatisfied with 
his representation and were most likely to vote against him.  
Notwithstanding all of the noises that the Court makes about race, Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged this key fact. He remarked, “the reason for taking 
Latinos out of District 23, according to the District Court, was to protect 
Congressman Bonilla from a constituency that was increasingly voting 
against him.”45 The fact that those votes were voters of color was fortuitous. 
It served to underscore the problem; it provided the Court a statutory and 
doctrinal hook for articulating its concerns; and it shielded the Court from 
accusations that it was further enmeshing itself into the political thicket. 
Though once again we are blinded by race, one should not get away from the 
underlying political facts of the case: District 23 was altered for political as 
opposed to racial reasons.  
One must also acknowledge how the Court comes to grips with the 
politics of the case. The problem with District 23 is that Texas decided that 
Bonilla was going to be the representative of District 23 irrespective of the 
preferences of the voters. This assignment of representation is inconsistent 
with the central mechanism of democracy for attaining representation, which 
is an election.46 As Justice Kennedy noted, Latino voters were mobilizing 
and were on the cusp of realizing a fuller extent of their political power at the 
ballot box.47 As he remarked, it is precisely because Latino voters were about 
to exercise their political power and were about to do so in a manner that was 
inconsistent with the preferences of the State, that the State removed them 
 
45 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622. 
46 The theoretical ideas that underlie this part are fully fleshed out in Guy-Uriel E. 
Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601 (2007). 
47 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622. 
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from the district.48 The question for the Court’s gerrymandering 
jurisprudence is whether there are limitations on a State’s ability to alter 
electoral structures when voter preferences are inimical to the state’s 
preferences.49 What is the purpose of elections if the State will repeatedly 
seek to impose its preferences on the electoral process?  
Relatedly, as the Court recognized, the assignment of representation 
undermines the accountability function of elections. Justice Kennedy noted: 
[Though] incumbency protection can be a legitimate factor in districting . . . 
experience teaches that incumbency protection can take various forms, not 
all of them in the interests of the constituents. If the justification for 
incumbency protection is to keep the constituency intact so the officeholder 
is accountable for promises made or broken, then the protection seems to 
accord with concern for the voters. If, on the other hand, incumbency 
protection means excluding some voters from the district simply because 
they are likely to vote against the officeholder, the change is to benefit the 
officeholder, not the voters. By purposely redrawing lines around those who 
opposed Bonilla, the state legislature took the latter course.50  
Thus, Justice Kennedy’s primary concern with District 23 is the 
assignment of representation by the State.  
One cannot gainsay the fact that the accountability function of elections 
is rendered ineffective if redistricters prior to the election can remove from 
the district the individuals most likely to vote against the representative. As 
the quote above demonstrates, this observation did not escape the Court’s 
attention. 
It is this accountability function that makes for effective representation. 
Though a representative can be motivated to be responsive to her constituents 
by a sense of obligation or by the fortuitous congruence of preferences, we 
rely upon elections as the primary mechanism to ensure responsiveness and 
effective motivation. If we are to maximize the possibility for effective 
representation, there must be a robust mechanism by which a representative 
is held accountable by her constituents. 
This account also best explains why Justice Kennedy was unsympathetic 
to the plaintiffs in District 24. African-American voters in District 24 argued 
that changes to the district diluted their votes in violation of Section 2. 
Though African Americans did not constitute a majority of voters in the 
district—they constituted 26% of the citizen-age voting population—they 
argued that they effectively controlled the district because they constituted 
 
48 Id. 
49 Or perhaps more precisely, the question is whether there are non-race-based 
limitations on such state action. 
50 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622–23 (citation omitted). 
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the majority of voters in the Democratic primary of a Democratic district. 
Using the district court’s finding that African-American voters could not 
elect their candidate of choice in the primary, Justice Kennedy rejected the 
Section 2 claim. Justice Kennedy argued: 
[Absent] any contested Democratic primary in District 24 over the last 20 
years, no obvious benchmark exists for deciding whether African-
Americans could elect their candidate of choice. The fact that African-
Americans voted for Frost—in the primary and general elections—could 
signify he is their candidate of choice. Without a contested primary, 
however, it could also be interpreted to show (assuming racial bloc voting) 
that Anglos and Latinos would vote in the Democratic primary in greater 
numbers if an African-American candidate of choice were to run, especially 
given Texas’ open primary system.51 
The challenge for the plaintiffs challenging the dismantling of District 24 
is that they are asking the Court to restore an incumbent-protection 
gerrymander without sufficient justification. As Justice Kennedy remarked, 
this district was created by Democrat Martin Frost for Martin Frost when the 
Democrats last controlled the redistricting process. To restore Martin Frost to 
this district would be to undermine the principle against state assignment of 
representation, a principle that Justice Kennedy defended in safeguarding the 
representational rights of voters of District 23. It would also be to reward the 
partisan gerrymandering of the Democrats against the partisan 
gerrymandering of the Republicans, which Justice Kennedy refused to do 
when addressing the partisan gerrymandering claim.52  
Moreover, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, when the State assigns 
representation, it is difficult to determine who is an authentic representative. 
Authentic representation is determined by a process in which the electoral 
outcome is contestable.53 The problem here is that there were not genuine 
opportunities for true contestation. As did the district court, Justice Kennedy 
seems to credit the trial court testimony that the district was not contestable 
 
51 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2624. 
52 Id. at 2610. 
53 Note that my argument is not that the election has to be contested, but that it has 
to be contestable. Or more precisely, if the election is not contested, it is not because of 
artificial interference by the state. When the state assigns representation, the state limits, 
if not eliminates, opportunities for genuine contestation. So the problem is not 
contestation or competition, the problem is the artificial interference by the State to 
eliminate contestation or competition where it might otherwise exist. Thus, the evil to be 
avoided is not a lack of competition or contestation, but undue interference by the State. 
This is why I part company with Professor Katz’s thoughtful and provocative 
contribution to this symposium. See Katz, supra note 39. 
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because African-Americans could not elect their preferred candidates.54 
Thus, when the plaintiffs in District 24 come to the Court to complain that 
their representative was unfairly taken away, Justice Kennedy justly 
expressed skepticism: how are we to know that he was truly your 
representative without elections that are not capable of being contested?55 
The truth is we do not. State assignment of representation undermines the 
accountability function of elections and makes it difficult to determine 
authentic representation.  
Perhaps more importantly, this articulation of the harm provides some 
insight into Justice Kennedy’s inchoate representational rights concept, first 
explored in Vieth.56 Justice Kennedy opened his opinion in Vieth by noting 
that “A decision ordering the correction of all election district lines drawn for 
partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts to unprecedented 
intervention in the American political process.”57 He then went on, as many 
commentators have remarked, to note that “while understanding that great 
caution is necessary when approaching” the issue of gerrymandering, he 
“would not foreclose all possibility of relief if some limited and precise 
rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in 
some redistricting cases.”58 He then cautioned that this principle “must rest 
on something more than the conclusion that political classifications were 
applied. It must rest instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though 
generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way 
unrelated to any legitimate objective.”59  
The oddity of Justice Kennedy’s opinion is the introduction of this new 
concept of representational rights. Justice Kennedy referenced the concept 
throughout the opinion as if we all ought to know what representational 
rights are,60 yet he never defined it. So we are all left to guess. However, 
from his opinion in Vieth one can cull some basic parameters. First, the 
ostensible purpose of the “limited and precise rationale,” the constitutional 
principle, would be to protect representational rights. Second, 
representational rights belong to both voters and parties.61 Third, 
representational rights are not really rights in the traditional sense of the term 
 
54 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2625. 
55 Or perhaps, more precisely, elections that were designed to be uncontestable. 
56 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
57 Id. 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 307. 
60 See id. (“At first it might seem that courts could determine, by the exercise of 
their own judgment, whether political classifications are related to this object or instead 
burden representational rights.”). 
61 Id. at 313. 
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but more structural devices for limiting official overreaching in the design of 
electoral structures.62 Fourth and more substantively, representational rights 
are implicated when the government targets and burdens a group of voters 
simply because of the voters’ political identity.63  
LULAC is useful because it confirms this substantive principle and starts 
to map out its contours. Recall that Justice Kennedy’s task was to find a 
limited and precise rationale that would distinguish between permissible 
political classifications and impermissible political classifications. As Justice 
Kennedy stated in Vieth in discussing the relevance of the First Amendment 
in the political gerrymandering context, “the inquiry is not whether political 
classifications were used. The inquiry instead is whether political 
classifications were used to burden a group’s representational rights.”64 In 
contrasting the advantages of a First Amendment analysis to an Equal 
Protection Clause analysis, he maintained: 
The equal protection analysis puts its emphasis on the permissibility of an 
enactment’s classifications. This works where race is involved since 
classifying by race is almost never permissible. It presents a more 
complicated question when the inquiry is whether a generally permissible 
classification has been used for an impermissible purpose. That question 
can only be answered in the affirmative by the subsidiary showing that the 
classification as applied imposes unlawful burdens.65 
LULAC adds an additional element into the inquiry: the justification for 
the classification. The inquiry is not only whether a permissible political 
classification was used that burdened a group of voters; the inquiry also 
includes whether the State had an impermissible reason for imposing this 
burden. In constitutional law there are types of State justifications that cannot 
justify certain types of burdens upon groups or individuals; these 
impermissible justifications are sometimes referred to as exclusionary 
reasons.66  
Justice Kennedy’s incumbency protection analysis in LULAC is a perfect 
application of the constitutional law theory of exclusionary reasons. 
Incumbency protection is a permissible political classification. It implicates 
“representational rights” when it burdens a group of voters. It violates their 
representational rights when the State is motivated by an impermissible 
 
62 See Charles, supra note 46. 
63 Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 
1135–36 (2005). 
64 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 
65 Id. 
66 See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in 
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 712 (1994).  
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justification. In adjudicating a representational right, the permissibility of the 
State justification is paramount. 
Though the Court needs to continue to map out the margins of this new 
concept, we can see that it has content. It does real work in LULAC. The core 
substantive component is that, where the State’s design of electoral structures 
imposes burdens upon a group of voters, the State implicates the voters’ 
representational rights. Now it is true that all districting imposes a burden 
upon a certain group of voters. Whether redistricting violates a group of 
voters’ representational rights depends upon the permissibility of the State 
justification. The State is not justified when it burdens representational rights 
because those rights were about to be exercised (or were in fact exercised) in 
a manner that was inconsistent with the State’s preferences. Such a 
justification is an exclusionary reason. 
The assignment of representation in Districts 23 and 25 violated the 
representational rights of Latino voters who were poised to choose their 
representatives. The State burdened their representational rights by assigning 
them a representative based upon an impermissible purpose and deprived 
them of their ability to reap the reward of their political mobilization. The 
Court simply objected to this unjustifiable assignment of representation. 
This, I think, is the best explanation for the outcome in LULAC. 
What emerges from LULAC is the possibility that the Court will examine 
carefully incumbent protection gerrymanders—even those that do not have 
any racial implications. There does not seem to be a principle that would 
protect voters from incumbent protection gerrymanders when they are voters 
of color but would not protect them when they are white. Part of the question 
is how seriously the Court is willing to take this new representational right. 
V. NAVEL GAZING: ON THE MEANING OF LULAC  
To return to the theme of this Symposium, it is hard to predict what 
LULAC portends for the Roberts Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. From 
this temporal vantage point, LULAC appears to be hugely significant. For the 
first time in the modern voting rights era a majority on the Supreme Court 
found a violation of Section 2 of the VRA and concluded that a State was 
required to draw a majority-minority district. The opinion might reinvigorate 
the moribund concept of racial representation, which seemed out of favor in 
the wake of the Shaw cases. However, no less of an authority than Richard 
Pildes, one of the most perceptive students of the Court, is predicting doom 
for those concerned about the future of the VRA. In this Part, I explore the 
meaning of LULAC and its potential impact on the VRA. Part V.A explores 
the argument that LULAC signals the end for the VRA and concludes 
differently. Part V.B argues that LULAC is best understood as a case in which 
the Court is using race to limit the excesses of partisan line-drawing.  
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A. Why LULAC Does Not Spell the End for the VRA 
In his thoughtful and provocative contribution to this Symposium 
Professor Pildes remarks that “[f]ar from a ringing endorsement of the law of 
minority vote dilution, LULAC reveals a Court increasingly troubled by—
indeed, more and more resistant to—the very concept of minority vote 
dilution and the accompanying legal requirement of ‘safe minority 
districting.’”67 Professor Pildes reads LULAC as a strongly anti-essentialist 
opinion. Professor Pildes may turn out to be right about how LULAC is 
ultimately interpreted in future voting rights cases. However, the evidence of 
that projection is not contained in the only critical datum that we have 
currently on this score: LULAC itself. The fact that the Court found a Section 
2 violation is singularly significant in light of the Court’s previous voting 
rights cases that have taken a crabbed view of the voting rights of people of 
color.68 For the past decade and a half, the Court has sowed the seeds for the 
eventual holding that majority-minority districts, even where justified under 
the VRA, are inconsistent with the Constitution. Yet in LULAC we find 
Justice Kennedy no less speaking for at least four other members of the 
Court, eloquently advocating in favor of a majority-minority district. In light 
of the previous trend line—Shaw I, Miller v. Johnson, Bush v. Vera, Shaw II, 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, etc.—the fact that there is a strong majority on the Court 
that believes that the concept of racial representation is not ipso facto 
unconstitutional is critical to the immediate future of the VRA and is deeply 
inconsistent with the view that LULAC is unqualifiedly antagonistic to the 
concept of racial representation.  
When one examines LULAC carefully, it is apparent that the Court was 
presented with numerous opportunities to interpret the Act narrowly. Not 
only did the Court pass upon those opportunities to narrow the Act, in many 
cases, the Court actually broadened the scope of the Act. I will examine three 
such instances: (a) the Court’s analysis of the compactness requirement; (b) 
the Court’s reliance upon the theretofore constitutionally-suspect results test; 
and (c) the Court’s embryonic articulation of a more robust concept of 
discrimination in the political process. As I will show in this subpart, if a 
majority of the Court intended on sending a message about the decline of 
legally mandated racial districting, the message is not very clear.  
 
67 Richard H. Pidles, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2007). 
68 See generally Terry Smith, Autonomy Versus Equality: Voting Rights 
Rediscovered, 57 ALA. L. REV. 261 (2005). 
1204 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1185 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
1. Redefinition of the Compactness Requirement 
In previous cases, the Court had stated that where voters of color are 
dispersed, the State does not have an obligation under Section 2 to draw 
majority-minority districts. Specifically, in Bush v. Vera, the Court penned, 
“[i]f, because of the dispersion of the minority population, a reasonably 
compact majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a 
majority-minority district . . . .”69 LULAC presented an opportune moment to 
apply, if not narrow, the compactness requirement. Instead, the Court 
noticeably eroded this compactness requirement and may have laid the 
groundwork for its potential evisceration as a practical constraint under 
Section 2.70  
In LULAC, Justice Kennedy found fault with District 25 because the 
district was not sufficiently compact to serve as a Section 2 off-set district. 
Justice Kennedy’s compactness analysis prompted a sharp response from 
Chief Justice Roberts that compactness is not a requirement when the State 
draws a majority-minority district; it is only an element of a plaintiff’s 
Section 2 claim. Chief Justice Roberts is correct that, prior to LULAC, 
compactness was not recognized as an element of the State’s defense of a 
Section 2 district. Thus, he is right that Justice Kennedy introduced a 
heretofore new constraint on the State’s discretion when the State seeks to 
draw a Section 2 district.  
On the face of it, it seems that Justice Kennedy narrowed the reach of 
Section 2 by imposing a compactness requirement that did not exist prior to 
LULAC. That is one way to read Justice Kennedy’s compactness analysis, but 
I think that would be the wrong reading. Justice Kennedy’s point is that there 
must be symmetry between the plaintiff’s claim and the State’s defense when 
the plaintiff is bringing a Section 2 claim and the State is defending a Section 
2 district. As I will argue here, this compactness requirement is not very 
significant, and, because of the symmetry requirement, it lowers the 
compactness standard for Section 2 plaintiffs.  
What is compactness? Compactness is not necessarily geography, though 
geography is relevant. “While no precise rule has emerged governing § 2 
compactness,” the majority maintained in LULAC, the “inquiry should take 
into account ‘traditional districting principles such as maintaining 
communities of interest and traditional boundaries.’”71 Compactness does 
not disregard “[l]egitimate yet differing communities of interest . . . in the 
 
69 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979 (1996). 
70 Dan Ortiz concludes similarly. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48, 50–51 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/ 
firstimpressions/vol105/Ortiz.pdf. 
71 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2006) (citation omitted). 
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interest of race.”72 However, race is not irrelevant. As the majority noted, “in 
some cases members of a racial group in different areas—for example, rural 
and urban communities—could share similar interests and therefore form a 
compact district if the areas are reasonably close in proximity.”73 
Nevertheless, the Court stated that neither geography nor interest alone is 
sufficient to make a district non-compact.74 A district is non-compact only 
when it combines racial communities separated by both “enormous 
geographical distance . . . [and] disparate needs and interests . . . .”75 
The problem for Justice Kennedy is that he is committed to preserving 
District 23 as a Section 2 district but not District 25, and he is equally 
committed to a symmetry criterion of compactness. Under his symmetry 
condition for compactness, whatever standard he sets for the State when it is 
defending a Section 2 district is the same standard that will apply to plaintiffs 
when they are alleging vote dilution under Section 2. This means whatever 
standard of compactness Justice Kennedy applies to District 25 is the same 
standard of compactness that he will have to apply to District 23. To 
complicate matters for Justice Kennedy, as the Chief Justice explained, there 
are very few differences between Districts 23 and 25.76 Moreover, as Justice 
Scalia noted, the new District 23 is more compact than the old District 23,77 
which Justice Kennedy is trying to revive. Both districts are race-conscious, 
and the Latino populations in both districts are similarly dispersed. 
Consider this issue from the vantage point of a Court hostile to Section 2 
of the VRA. Such a Court easily could have used Vera (among other cases) to 
conclude that, because of population dispersion, Latino voters in District 23 
were not entitled to protection under Section 2. This would have been a 
perfectly reasonable application of the current caselaw. Indeed, if the Court 
were applying the current caselaw, this should have been the definition of 
compactness: a non-compact district is one in which voters of color are 
 
72 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Chief Justice Roberts argued: 
The majority’s squeamishness about the supposed challenge facing a Latino-
preferred candidate in District 25—having to appeal to Latino voters near the Rio 
Grande and those near Austin—is not unlike challenges candidates face around the 
country all the time, as part of a healthy political process. It is in particular not 
unlike the challenge faced by a Latino-preferred candidate in the district favored by 
the majority, former District 23, who must appeal to Latino voters both in San 
Antonio and El Paso, 540 miles away. 
Id. at 2661 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
77 Id. at 2666 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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geographically dispersed. The Court could have then reasoned that District 
23 was not protected under Section 2. If District 23 was not protected under 
Section 2, then District 25 was not required by the VRA as an offset district. 
Consequently, there would have been no compelling state interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This would have been a straightforward analysis of 
the Court’s Shaw jurisprudence. Thus, a Court hostile to the VRA could have 
struck down both districts in one fell swoop by a casual application of 
standard doctrine. Say what you will, it is remarkable that this Court did not 
take this path to resolving LULAC. In any event, the strong essentialism 
interpretation of LULAC is hard to square with the facts of the case. 
2. Reliance Upon the Results Test 
The Court had yet another opportunity to narrow the application of the 
Act by raising further doubts about the constitutionality of the results test of 
Section 2, the central provision of that section. Justice Kennedy’s conclusion 
that Texas diluted the votes of Latino voters in District 23 depended 
completely upon the results test. Though the Court intimated strongly that the 
plaintiffs could make out a claim of discriminatory intent,78 a point to which 
I shall shortly return, the Court was ultimately convinced that 
notwithstanding the State’s reason for redrawing District 23, the State 
“cannot justify the effect on Latino voters.”79  
Relying upon the results test to invalidate the redistricting plan is 
remarkable in view of the fact that the effects prong had long been 
constitutionally suspect and has up to now been viewed as one of the most 
vulnerable parts of the Act. Prior to LULAC, the Court had repeatedly called 
into question the constitutionality of Section 2’s results test by “assum[ing] 
without deciding that compliance with the results test . . . can be a 
compelling state interest.”80 A Court as troubled by racial vote dilution as 
Professor Pildes portrays the Court in LULAC would have taken the ready 
opportunity to emphatically add another stake through the heart of the Act. 
Instead, the Court chose to extend the life of the Act by reducing doubts 
about its most critical provision. 
 
78 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622. 
79 Id. at 2623; see also id. at 2615 (noting that “the concomitant rise in Latino voting 
power in each successive election, the near-victory of the Latino candidate of choice in 
2002, and the resulting threat to the Bonilla incumbency, were the very reasons that led 
the State to redraw the district lines”). 
80 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Stephen E. 
Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350 (2002) (stating 
that the Court is close to finding the results test unconstitutional). 
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3. Redefining the Meaning of Discrimination 
Perhaps the most radical possibility in the opinion centers around the 
intriguing comments by Justice Kennedy that the redesign of District 23, 
which “took away the Latinos’ opportunity because Latinos were about to 
exercise it . . . bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could give 
rise to an equal protection violation.”81 This comment is intriguing because it 
is not clear what it means. As some commentators have noted, if all Justice 
Kennedy means to say is that intentional discrimination in the design of 
electoral structures is unconstitutional, this is hardly earth-shattering.82 
However, if Justice Kennedy means to equate a Section 2 violation with 
intentional discrimination, Justice Kennedy would have severely limited the 
reach and effectiveness of Section 2.83 
But consider a third alternative. Consistent with the argument advanced 
in Part III, Justice Kennedy’s point may be the simple, but doctrinally radical, 
idea that the State intentionally discriminates against voters (of color?) where 
the State intentionally deprives them of an electoral benefit to which they 
would otherwise be entitled for reasons that are not constitutionally 
permissible. Importantly, the intentional discrimination that concerns Justice 
Kennedy is not racial intent. That is, the Court is not making an argument 
that Latinos were targeted because they were Latinos. In fact, the Court 
stated, “[e]ven if we accept the District Court’s finding that the State’s action 
was taken primarily for political, not racial reasons,” that does not change the 
constitutional analysis.84  
The surprise here is that this is the one argument that Texas should have 
been able to make. The State’s argument is that, to the extent redistricting 
affected the voting power of voters in District 23, the voters they were after 
were not Latinos but Democrats. Under the prior caselaw, Texas had every 
reason to believe that it could get away with this distinction between race and 
politics. This is simply the application of Whitcomb v. Chavis85 and White v. 
Regester.86 Whitcomb stands for the proposition that a racial group that 
aligns itself primarily with a political party is not buffeted by the vagaries of 
the political process where its disadvantages are the results of politics.87 
White stands for the complementary proposition that racial groups are 
 
81 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622. 
82 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 39, at 1171. 
83 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 66. 
84 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.  
85 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
86 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
87 Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 153–55. 
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protected from political disadvantages where those disadvantages are visited 
upon them because of (as opposed to in spite of) their race.  
A Court hostile to racial representation could have applied that principle 
with a vengeance. Yet, the Court refused to take that easy option. In fact, the 
Court went on to strongly imply that even if it is true that the State did not 
target Latinos because they are Latinos, the State may have intentionally 
discriminated in a way that is constitutionally actionable because it intended 
to deprive the group of an electoral opportunity. The intent that matters is the 
intent to cause a particular effect: the intent to burden.  
This is a significantly new development, and it has the potential of 
radically transforming voting rights and antidiscrimination doctrine. The 
majority created a constitutional standard of voting discrimination that 
essentially mirrors the Section 2 effects standard. This development was 
sufficiently worrisome to Justice Scalia that he devoted a few paragraphs 
reviewing first-year constitutional law doctrine on the meaning of 
discriminatory purpose.88  
What is the meaning of this development? How are we to understand this 
new equal protection standard?  
I think there are two ways to understand this equal protection right. One 
explanation is that this equal protection right is another way of articulating 
the representational rights that are thought to be protected by the 
Constitution. Think of this right as similar to free speech doctrine: just as the 
government regulation that burdens speech is constitutionally actionable, 
government regulation that burdens an electoral right is also constitutionally 
actionable. In this construction, the right is an electoral right having nothing 
to do with race. Where the State burdens an electoral right, the Constitution 
is implicated.89  
A different and even more radical explanation is that this equal protection 
right is a redefinition of the meaning of intentional racial discrimination in 
the voting rights context (and maybe even antidiscrimination law itself). This 
right is different from the traditional discriminatory intent standard in that it 
does not require intent to target the racial group. However, it applies only 
when the voting rights of a racial group are intentionally burdened by the 
State. 
To concretize the point, recall here McCleskey v. Kemp, where plaintiffs 
argued that Georgia’s application of the death penalty was discriminatory 
because of the racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty. The 
Court’s argument in McCleskey was a classic equal protection argument. The 
Court argued that the plaintiff could not prevail because he could not show 
 
88 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). 
89 Note that the point is not that the Constitution is violated, but that the plaintiff has 
a potential claim. 
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that the State implemented the death penalty because of (as opposed to in 
spite of) its racially discriminatory effects upon African Americans. For his 
claim to prevail, “McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia 
Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an 
anticipated racially discriminatory effect.”90 This is a standard application of 
equal protection doctrine. 
Contrast McCleskey with LULAC. In LULAC, Justice Kennedy seemed 
to say that even if Texas adopted its course of action because of an 
anticipated political effect, the Constitution could still be violated. It is the 
effect of the State’s action that matters and not its intent. If the Court is 
serious about this move, it is hugely significant.  
If this articulation of the racial electoral equality right seems far-fetched, 
consider LULAC from the perspective of a redistricter. If you are redistricting 
post-LULAC and you wish to comply with statutory and constitutional 
commands, or you wish to avoid litigation, what do you do with LULAC? 
Note how far the facts of LULAC are from the prototypical racial vote 
discrimination case. The Act was originally conceived to address 
discrimination that would be conceived as discriminatory animus against 
African-Americans, in particular, that could not be regulated within the 
extant constitutional framework because of structural and evidentiary 
reasons. The VRA was adopted in a context in which black voters were 
intentionally discriminated against by both the State and white voters. In the 
classic vote dilution cases, the State would crack and pack voters of color 
because it wanted to preclude them from participating in the political 
process. White voters would not vote for any candidates of color not because 
they disagreed with the politics of candidates of color, but because they were 
colored. 
LULAC bears none of the markers of the classic vote dilution cases. 
Though white and Latino voters in District 23 prefer different candidates at 
the polls, by voting repeatedly for Bonilla, white voters have demonstrated 
their commitment to voting for a candidate of color provided that the 
candidate shares their political ideology. Moreover, there is no evidence at all 
of racial animus from the State.91 There is every reason to believe that if 
Latino voters were more supportive of Bonilla, Texas Republicans would 
have protected their district as opposed to trying to weaken it. Moreover, by 
all accounts, the State attempted to mitigate for its modification of District 23 
by providing an alternative district.92  
 
90 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987). 
91 This is not to deny that there is racial discrimination in Texas. The point here is 
simply that there is absolutely no evidence of racial animus in this case. 
92 As recounted by Steve Bickerstaff, the Republicans strategy on race was three-
fold. First, they attempted to co-opt leaders and organizations of color to join them 
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If on the basis of those facts the Supreme Court not only found a 
violation of Section 2 of the VRA, but also concluded that those facts 
amounted to intentional discrimination, if you are redistricting, do you dare 
weaken any majority-minority districts? If you would like to comply with 
constitutional norms or you want to minimize the risk of litigation, you will 
not take any action that can be interpreted as undermining the voting power 
of voters of color. If the Court takes LULAC seriously, majority-minority 
districts post-LULAC are sacrosanct.  
B. Using Race to Check Politics  
All the same, I agree with Professor Pildes to the extent that his argument 
is that LULAC was not intended as a victory for the VRA.93 LULAC is not 
primarily about race. While the view of LULAC as a race case has merit as an 
explanatory variable, it may not suffice to explain many moves in the 
opinion. First, as Professor Pildes notes, LULAC would be a strong VRA case 
if it had not resulted in an effective swap of District 25 for District 23.94 As a 
practical matter, Latino voters did not gain much following LULAC. Had 
Justice Kennedy permitted Latino voters to hold on to District 25 as a 
majority-Latino district and add District 23 as a majority-Latino district, then 
LULAC could be understood as an unqualified endorsement of racial 
representation. Given the Court’s holding and the result of the Court’s 
holding, such a conclusion is unwarranted. Second, the explanation of 
LULAC as a strong vindication of the VRA is even less persuasive in view of 
the fact that Justice Kennedy chose to protect Latino voters in District 23, but 
not African-American voters in District 24. 
LULAC is best understood as a case that uses race to limit politics. 
LULAC reflects the Court’s medium-term strategy for containing the 
excesses of partisan gerrymandering. This is the best way to make sense of 
the case. Justice Kennedy attacked one of the devices that the State used to 
facilitate its partisan gerrymander. If you can prevent the redistricters from 
moving voters of color around, you are imposing yet another additional 
constraint on their ability to maximize partisan gerrymandering.95 The 
Court’s strategy is to identify effective structural constraints that limit the 
 
against the white Democrats. BICKERSTAFF, supra note 9, at 275–76. Second, they sought 
to portray their plan as being beneficial to voters of color. Id. at 264–65. Third, whenever 
their partisan agenda conflicted with the interests of voters of color, partisanship trumped. 
Id. at 265. 
93 I think the effect of the opinion, as I have argued in this Essay, is to, at least in the 
short-term, expand the reach of Section 2. 
94 Pildes, supra note 66. 
95 See Ortiz, supra note 70. 
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discretion of the State when it is engaged in line-drawing. This is not a bad 
strategy and may actually work.96 
The Court has long, and somewhat ineffectively, used its jurisprudence 
on racial vote dilution to help guide its thinking about political vote 
dilution.97 Though the racial vote dilution caselaw has long provided an 
incentive for litigants to frame their partisan claims in racial terms, those 
cases have been almost exclusively concerned about race and not politics.98 
What is different about the Court’s move in LULAC is the attempt to check 
politics by using race. Thus, the “politics not race” argument that emerged 
from the tail-end of the Shaw lines of cases and upon which the district court 
in LULAC relied is no longer the ironclad defense it was perceived to be. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Though I think the Court’s strategy might work to limit the excesses of 
politics, I worry about what the strategy will do to voting rights doctrine and 
to the electoral prospects of voters of color. On doctrinal grounds, while the 
strategy might be useful in the short-term, it is ultimately flawed because it 
papers over important doctrinal tensions, some more evident than others, that 
are created or exacerbated by the manner in which the majority in LULAC 
attempts to check politics by limiting what the State can do with race. The 
best evidence of this tension is the dispute between Justice Kennedy and the 
Chief Justice with respect to whether compactness is an element of the 
State’s defense when the State draws a Section 2 district. Other more 
pressing tensions include the need to reconcile the various doctrinal 
approaches among the Court’s decisions in LULAC, Thornburg v. Gingles, 
Johnson v. De Grandy, Georgia v. Ashcroft, and the Shaw cases.  
For example it is not clear to me that the Gingles factors are doing much 
work any more. Or perhaps more accurately, the Gingles factors appear to 
serve as threshold factors and do not seem determinative. Instead the totality 
of circumstances approach appears to be doing most of the work. The 
difficulty is that the totality of circumstances approach is more indeterminate 
and seems ad hoc. Part of the problem is that as racial bloc voting decreases 
and as voters of color become more dispersed, Gingles will be harder and 
harder to apply. In LULAC, Gingles served as a pro forma hurdle that the 
 
96 On the importance of constraints in the redistricting process, see Andrew Gelman 
& Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 541, 542 (1994). 
97 Charles, supra note 46. 
98 See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 632 (2002). 
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Court easily skipped over. Thus, one remaining question is how long the 
Court will continue to pay lip service to Gingles. 
One must also be sensitive to the doctrinal strain between Sections 2 and 
5 of the VRA as highlighted by Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. Texas 
created an off-set majority-minority district in order to comply with Section 
5. It remains unclear after LULAC whether Texas could have created a 
coalition or influence district, which would have enabled Texas to comply 
with Section 5 but would not have been dilutive under Section 2. Georgia v. 
Ashcroft allows the State to be more flexible in the design of electoral 
structures when the State is complying with Section 5. But LULAC does not 
seem to permit the same flexibility with respect to Section 2. 
Further, it is also not clear how States should navigate between LULAC 
and Shaw. Shaw comes into play when the State is too race-conscious. 
LULAC comes into play when the State is not sufficiently race-conscious. 
Not only should you pay attention to voters of color, but you have to make 
sure that they are the right kind. Are you mixing urban dwellers with 
suburban dwellers? Are you mixing recent immigrants with native-born 
citizens? Are you mixing rural residents with urban residents? Are you 
mixing rich with poor? LULAC calls for a heightened sense of race-
consciousness that opens up the State to liability under Shaw. This 
heightened sense of race-consciousness may further racialize redistricting 
disputes and lead to the type of boomerang effect that resulted in the Shaw 
line of cases.  
Finally, as a practical matter, it remains unclear whether voters of color 
are better off under Justice Kennedy’s rules-bound and racially-instrumental 
doctrinal approach than under the Chief Justice’s doctrinal olla podrida. The 
Chief Justice’s approach seemed motivated by the recognition that politics 
can be a dirty process; this recognition is accompanied by a reluctance to 
sully the Court by deeply enmeshing it into that process. Consequently, it 
seems as if Chief Justice Roberts was sympathetic to an anything-goes 
approach—presumably complemented by a generous interpretation of 
applicable constitutional and statutory constraints. My sense is that this 
framework would not be particularly solicitous of the political needs of 
voters of color, but it would also allow them to keep hard-fought race-
conscious political gains. By contrast, Justice Kennedy’s approach might be 
more solicitous of the needs of voters of color—by strictly enforcing a floor 
below which the State may not go to deprive voters of color of 
representation. But Justice Kennedy’s approach would also come with a low 
ceiling that would preclude the State from being race-conscious where the 
State could not justify its actions on the basis of a narrowly-construed 
constitutional or statutory mandate. Thus, Professor Pildes might be right that 
LULAC may eventually become an unwelcome development for those who 
value the concept of racial representation. 
